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INTRODUCTION
The past several decades have seen a rapid spread of 
union organization among public employees. Membership 
growth rates are far in excess of the modest expansion in 
the private economy. In addition, increasing militancy has 
been exhibited by both the old and new public employee 
unions. As these developments have occurred, public 
employers have dealt with them in a variety of ways. Pro­
cedures developed for use in private industry have been 
incorporated into the personnel policies of municipal, 
state, and federal employers. But as has been pointed out:
The resolution of disputes over the terms of a 
new agreement . . . may require a different ap­
proach from the one used in private industry. In 
private industry our present national labor policy 
places heavy emphasis on the role of economic 
conflict in dispute settlement. In the public 
sphere, however, law and tradition make the use 
of the strike illegal, or, at least, far less 
appropriate. Reliance is placed instead upon 
other procedural devices such as admonition by 
influential government leaders, mediation, fact­
finding with or without recommendations, voluntary 
arbitration, and referral of disputes to the 
appropriate political body for passage of legisla­
tion.^
James L. Stern, "The Wisconsin Public Employee Fact- 
Finding Procedure," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
XX, No. 1 (1966), 3.
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Dispute resolution procedures in the public sector 
have received a great deal of attention. Strikes and other 
concerted action by public employees, when they do occur, 
are usually given extensive media coverage. Furthermore, 
the public has a direct consumer interest in these matters. 
For example, parents have a serious interest in the quality 
of education in addition to their desire to avoid teacher 
strikes.^
The intent of this paper is to evaluate the effective­
ness of the fact-finding process in the area of public 
employee collective bargaining in Montana. A full apprecia­
tion of any aspect of the fact-finding procedure requires 
an understanding of how fact-finding is incorporated into 
the impasse structure of the law which governs it. In 
Montana, this law is the Public Employees Collective Bar- 
gaining Act.
The Act, which was adopted by the Montana Legislature 
in 1973, was modeled on the federal Labor Management Rela­
tions Act.^ It represented the state's first comprehensive 
legislation relating to labor relations, and affected the 
majority of public employees. At the time of the enactment.
2william E. Simkin, Mediation and the Dynamics of Col­
lective Bargaining (Washington, D.C.; The Bureau of National 
Affairs, Inc., 1971), p. 348.
^Sections 39-31-101 through 39-31-409, Montana Code 
Annotated, 1979.
^Emilie Loring, "Labor Relations Law in Montana," 
Montana Law Review, XXXIX (1978), 40.
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both the university system and the public school system, 
the latter then covered by its own act, were excluded from 
coverage. However, the university was included in 1974 and 
the public schools in 1975.^ Except for registered nurses 
in public health care facilities and professional engineers 
and engineers in training, the Act now covers all of 
Montana's non-management public employees.
The Collective Bargaining Act provides a mechanism for 
the election of an exclusive representative for purposes 
of collective bargaining and makes unlawful, as unfair labor 
practices, certain behavior of public employers and labor 
organizations. Labor organizations are permitted to bargain 
collectively with employers with respect to "wages, hours, 
fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment."
The collective bargaining process itself is a matter 
between the employer and the labor organization, and, as 
long as both sides bargain in good faith, is not subject to 
state regulation. But in the event the employee organiza­
tion and the public employer are unable to come to an 
agreement and bargaining is deadlocked, the law provides 
procedures to resolve the dispute. The Act requires the 
parties to request mediation, either if agreement has not 
been reached after a reasonable period of negotiation or if 
a dispute still exists on the date of expiration of a prior 
collective bargaining agreement. Upon petition, the Board
^Ibid.
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of Personnel Appeals (the agency which administers the law) 
supplies a mediator to assist the parties in reaching an 
agreement. Costs of mediation are borne by the Board.
If mediation is unsuccessful, the parties may request 
fact-finding, or the Board itself may initiate fact-finding. 
In this process, the Board submits to the parties a list of 
names of five possible fact finders. The parties alternately 
strike two names. The remaining name is that of the person 
designated as the fact finder. The fact finder then meets 
with the parties and makes written findings of fact and 
recommendations for resolution of the dispute. The Act 
does not require that either party accept the fact finder’s 
recommendations.
The fact finder may make his report public five days 
after it is submitted to the parties. If the dispute is not 
settled, he must make it public fifteen days after submis­
sion to the parties. It is apparent that the legislature 
believed that public pressure brought to bear upon the 
parties as a result of the fact finder’s report would en­
courage the parties to settle the dispute.^
It should be noted that the Act also permits the 
parties voluntarily to agree to submit any or all of the 
issues in dispute to final and binding arbitration. If such 
an agreement to arbitrate is reached by the parties, the 
arbitration, by law, supersedes the fact-finding procedures.
^Ibid., 43.
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Unlike public employee collective bargaining laws in 
some other states, Montana does not require that parties 
refrain from strikes or lockouts during mediation or fact­
finding. The Montana Supreme Court upheld the right of 
public employees to strike in State Department of Highways
7V. Public Employees Craft Council. It can be assumed that 
even though the Montana statute permits strikes by public 
employees, the impasse procedures are designed to secure a 
settlement of the dispute without incurring a strike. As 
noted in the report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force 
on Labor Disputes in Public Employment, "A broad consensus 
finds an overriding public interest in the continuous opera-
Otion of vital government services."
What exactly is fact-finding? The basic idea is that a
neutral determination of the issues in dispute, particularly
when accompanied by recommendations for their settlement,
will either bring public pressure to bear upon the parties
or will force the parties themselves to take a new view of
their own and the public's interest. In any event, it is
assumed that the parties will come to a settlement at or
near the terms suggested by the fact finder. As Charles
Rehmus points out;
. . . the procedure envisages a final settlement
to be one still made by the parties themselves 
and, to this degree, acceptable to them. It
^As found in Ibid., 49.
^Pickets at City Hall (New York: The Twentieth Century
Fund, 1970), p. 3.
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thereby retains an important element of voluntarism 
in the establishment of collective bargaining 
agreements.
But Spero and Capozzola also remind us that:
Finding the facts is not as antiseptic or easy as 
would appear. There is inevitably a tendency for 
each side to present only those facts favorable to 
it. If the issues involved are complex, the ple­
thora of facts produced by one side is inexorably 
controverted by statistics elicited from the other 
side. And all the facts are presented in a 
judicial atmosphere wafted about by political 
breezes from the outside.
William Simkin, Director of the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service during the Kennedy and Johnson admini­
strations, hastens to add that:
Even if one party has not faced up to unpleasant 
facts, the issue is not the facts but whether they 
are decisive or should be given little or no 
weight. In other words, it is the significance 
of the facts, not the facts themselv^, that is 
the core of the dispute on the issues.
Fact-finding has perhaps received more attention than 
any other type of procedural mechanism used to deal with 
bargaining impasses in the public sector. The first reason 
for this attention has been the hope that fact-finding could 
be an effective strike substitute. It also is due in part 
to the fact that there has been considerable experience with
QCharles M. Rehmus, "Fact-Finding and the Public 
Interest" (paper presented at the Inaugural Convention of 
the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution at 
Reston, Virginia, October 17-19, 1973), p. 3.
^^Sterling D. Spero and John M. Capozzola, The Urban 
Community and Its Unionized Bureaucracies (New York: Dunel-
len Publishing Co., 1973), p. 282.
l^Simkin, p. 238.
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mediation and grievance arbitration in the private sector
1 0but little previous experience with fact-finding.
Another reason that accounts for the attention paid to 
fact-finding is the confusion about the process. Many state 
laws and a sizable group of students in the field speak of 
it as advisory arbitration while others think of it as media­
tion. There appears to have been a considerable debate 
among scholars over whether fact-finding is strictly a 
formal adjudicatory process, or one of adjustment. But more 
recently there seems to be agreement that the process is a 
mixture of both. This idea is best stated by Rehmus:
It seems to me that the answer as to what set of 
facts one will decide upon is almost entirely a 
matter of values, of passing judgment on the vari­
ous sets of facts that are presented. Even those 
who opt for the adjudicatory approach, therefore, 
seem to me to have to face up to the fact that 
persuasion and mediation are inherent,in the pro­
cess if it is to be at all successful.
The flexibility of the process may be the very reason 
that fact-finding persists as a popular dispute resolution 
procedure in the public sector. Legislators, and perhaps 
many of the parties, continue to believe that fact-finding 
has some of the advantages of both mediation and arbitration 
and few of their weaknesses. Any procedure that has such 
great appeal for legislators deserves attention and careful
1 2Thomas P. Gilory and Anthony V. Sinicropi, "Impasse 
Resolution in Public Employment: A Current Assessment,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, XXV, No. 4 (1972).
13Rehmus, p. 9.
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Study. Furthermore, as Arbitrator Arnold Zack has pointed 
out;
It is increasingly evident that the problems of 
public employment collective bargaining are in 
flux and that the effective procedures of today
may prove to be ineffective within the near
future, particularly as the sophistication, as 
well as perhaps y^e militancy of the parties 
continues to grow.
Therefore it is indeed appropriate and necessary to under­
take a study of the effectiveness of fact-finding in public 
employee collective bargaining in Montana. In this way,
we can recognize weaknesses in the existing procedures, 
anticipate possible areas of future difficulty and adapt
existing machinery for dispute resolution so that it may be 
more effective in the future.
^^Amold M. Zack, "Improving Mediation and Fact-Finding 
in the Public Sector," Labor Law Journal, XXI, No. 5 (1970), 
260.
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REVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES
Studies of fact-finding have been conducted in a number 
of different states. A review of these studies brings to 
light various concepts which are important in evaluating 
the effectiveness of fact-finding in Montana.
One of the earliest studies of fact-finding was con­
ducted in Wisconsin. James Stern cited four general stan­
dards against which one can measure whether fact-finding has 
been successful. These include (1) the results of the pro­
cedure— that is, whether the disputes giving rise to the 
fact-finding petitions were successfully or unsuccessfully 
resolved; (2) the opinions of those using the procedure and 
those administering it; (3) whether fact-finding has been 
over- or under-used and whether its availability has tended 
to affect positively or negatively the collective bargaining
process; and (4) whether the procedure has reduced conflict
15and served as a substitute for the strike.
In the same study. Stern concluded that the fact­
finding process was being utilized by an increasing number 
of teacher organizations throughout the state and appeared 
to be both highly regarded and working well. Eight years
^^Stern, 9.
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later, in 1974, Gatewood found that fact-finding was no 
longer held in such high regard. He concluded that fact­
finding was serving to prolong negotiations to the extent 
that the parties automatically incorporated it into the 
bargaining process.
Given the availability of factfinding, serious bar­
gaining may not ensue until after the fact finder's 
recommendations have been made. Where this tactic 
has been employed, labor organizations generally 
view favorable recommendations as the basis upon 
which their actual demands will be formulated. 
Likewise, boards have taken such recommendations to 
define the limits from which they will bargain down 
in negotiations. In addition, disputes have been 
protracted to the extent that factfinding has been 
petitioned solely for the purpose of stalling, thus 
allowing the parties to escape serious and continu­
ous bargaining.
Most theories of the bargaining process suggest that 
"hard bargaining" or movement will occur when the costs of 
continuing the dispute exceed the costs of making a compro­
mise or concession to settle the dispute. To the extent 
that multiple steps are built into the impasse procedure 
that proceed from milder to strong forms of intervention,
final resolution may be even further removed from the
17initial bargaining process. This phenomenon has been 
discussed in the literature as the "chilling effect" because
Lucian B. Gatewood, "Factfinding in Teacher Disputes: 
The Wisconsin Experience," Monthly Labor Review, XCVII, 
No. 10 (1974), 49.
17Thomas A. Kochan, "Dynamics of Dispute Resolution 
in the Public Sector," in Public Sector Bargaining, ed. by 
Benjamin Aaron, Joseph R. Grodin and James L. Stern (Wash­
ington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1979),
p. 176.
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it has a negative effect on the collective bargaining process, 
Some critics of fact-finding believe that it hinders 
the effectiveness of mediation. Under Montana law, media­
tion is the first step in dispute resolution so it is 
important to consider this criticism in a study of fact­
finding. Zack maintains that:
Mediation, with fact-finding waiting in the wings, 
sometimes takes on the appearance of a rite which 
must be gone through before the parties get to real 
crisis bargaining. The problem is made somewhat 
worse by the fact-finder's tendency to delve enthu­
siastically into what transpired at mediation so he 
can gauge the area of acceptability of his own re­
port. If this happens in one year's impasse, it as­
suredly will lead the parties the next year to hold 
offers of compromise close to their chest during 
mediation, recognizing that they will have to yield,_ 
even more when they get to fact-finding and beyond.
Another phenomenon often discussed in the literature 
of collective bargaining is the "narcotic effect." This 
describes the situation in which the parties become over - 
dependent on the impasse procedures. In this respect, fact­
finding could become the first and not the final step in 
collective bargaining. As stated by Wellington and Winter:
The post-impasse procedure should not hinder col­
lective bargaining. The major hope for avoiding 
strikes in the public sector is not the post­
impasse procedures but the bargaining process; not 
the resolution of impasses but their avoidance. 
Resort to post-impasse procedures, therefore, ought 
not to be so automatic as to become a routine step 
in the process of reaching a settlement. For if it 
does, serious bargaining may be deferred until
1_ 8Arnold M. Zack, "Impasses, Strikes and Resolution," in 
Public Workers and Public Unions, ed. by Sam Zagoria (Engle­
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 112.
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the procedures ^ e  invoked and impasses will also 
become routine.
Thus for the fact-finding procedure to be effective, some
deterrents must be incorporated into the procedure to
encourage meaningful collective bargaining and discourage
automatic resort to the impasse procedures. One possible
deterrent is cost.
Where fact finding is provided without cost to the 
parties and where its invocation is fairly auto­
matic under the statutory procedures, the parties 
may have less incentive to accept the results 
than where the procedure is one of their own
choosing and their own financing.
Another deterrent to the fact-finding process is investment
of the time required by the parties to exhaust the impasse
procedures. A final deterrent is the role of public opinion.
Uncertainty as to public opinion is also assumed to 
act as a deterrent and to encourage negotiations.
That is, inability to predict the direction in 
which factfinding will guide public opinion makes 
the procedure so unattractive that the parties 
would rather raach an agreement without public 
recommendations.
The concept of acceptability relates generally to the 
opinions of the parties concerning the fact-finding pro­
cess— whether they accept the recommendations of the fact
Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The 
Unions and the Cities (Washington, B.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1971), p. 174.
20Jean T. McKelvey, "Fact Finding in Public Employment 
Disputes: Promise or Illusion?" Industrial and Labor Rela­
tions Review, XXIV, No. 2 (1971), 540.
21William R. Word, "Factfinding in Public Employee 
Negotiations," Monthly Labor Review, XCV, No. 2 (1972), 61.
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finder in specific instances, as well as whether they regard 
fact-finding as an acceptable procedure for settling dis­
putes. The role that the fact finder plays in the process 
is also important and it influences the acceptance of fact­
finding by the parties. Pegnetter concluded in his study of 
the criteria used by fact finders, that most fact finders
are concerned primarily with acceptability by the parties
22when they write their recommendations.
In summary, based on studies elsewhere, one would 
expect that if the fact-finding process in Montana is effec­
tive, then certain conditions could be identified. First of 
all, the availability of the fact-finding process should not 
have a negative effect on the collective bargaining that 
takes place before the fact-finding procedures are put into 
operation. There should be evidence that the availability 
of fact-finding does not cause the parties to refrain from 
serious bargaining prior to the initiation of the impasse 
procedures. In addition, the effectiveness of mediation of 
disputes by Board of Personnel Appeals staff members prior 
to fact-finding should not be hampered by the availability 
of the fact-finding process. Secondly, if fact-finding
is effective, there should be evidence that the parties 
have not become overdependent on the process. It would be 
possible to identify adequate deterrents to the overuse of
22Richard Pegnetter, "Fact Finding and Teacher Salary 
Disputes: The 1969 Experience in New York State," Indus­
trial and Labor Relations Review, XXIV, No. 2 (1971), 229.
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fact-finding such as the investment of time and money and 
the fear of adverse public opinion. Finally, one would 
expect that the fact finders themselves strive to make 
recommendations which are acceptable to the parties and that 
the parties do accept the recommendations made by the fact 
finders. In addition, the parties would be expected to view 
the fact-finding process as an acceptable one for resolving 
their bargaining disputes.
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METHODOLOGY
Research to determine the effectiveness of fact-finding 
in the public sector in Montana was conducted with the 
cooperation of the Administrator of the Board of Personnel 
Appeals during the summer and fall of 1979. Much of the 
research is based on the work of Yaffe and Goldblatt^^ 
whose study of fact-finding is perhaps one of the most 
detailed.
Data for the study was collected by means of question­
naires sent to both fact finders and parties who partici­
pated in the fact-finding process during the years 1977 and 
1978. In order to broaden the sample, as well as to gather 
data about what factors may have contributed to settlement 
before a fact-finding hearing was held, data was solicited 
for all cases in which fact-finding was requested or recom­
mended, whether or not a hearing was actually held. A di­
gest of the particular case accompanied each questionnaire. 
The digest contained a summary of each party's position on 
each issue in dispute, as well as the fact finder's recom­
mendation and rationale. The digests were based on the
Byron Yaffe and Howard Goldblatt, Fact Finding in 
Public Employment Disputes in New York State; More Promise 
Than Illusion (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1971).
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fact finder’s reports from the files of the Board of Person­
nel Appeals. A cover letter explained the questionnaire and 
the study. Care was taken to assure the respondents that 
all replies would be strictly confidential.
During the years 1977 and 1978, there were twenty-eight 
cases in which fact-finding was requested by the parties 
and/or recommended by a Board of Personnel Appeals mediator. 
Of this number, eight cases were settled prior to or without 
resort to formal fact-finding. Of the remaining twenty 
cases, the fact finder mediated a settlement in three in­
stances. Thus, in only seventeen cases were formal fact­
finding hearings conducted and reports written.
Fifteen completed questionnaires were received from 
employee organizations. Of these, twelve responses were 
from cases in which formal fact-finding was held, two 
responses were from cases in which a formal fact-finding 
hearing was not held and one was from a case in which a 
settlement was mediated by the fact finder. Following is 
a breakdown of the employee groups involved in the twenty 
cases in which the fact-finding took place:
State, County and Municipal
Employees 10 cases
Non-Professional School
District Employees 4 cases
Teachers 2 cases
Firemen 2 cases
Police 2 cases
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Fifteen completed questionnaires were received from 
employers. Of this number, twelve responses were from 
cases in which formal fact-finding was held and three were 
from cases in which no formal fact-finding hearing was held. 
Seventeen completed questionnaires were received from fact 
finders. In thirteen of these cases, a completed question­
naire was also received from at least one of the parties.
Several factors contribute to the lack of response by 
some of the participants to whom questionnaires were sent. 
A number of individuals are no longer holding the position 
they did in 1977 and/or 1978. Even though the cover letter 
urged the recipient to forward the questionnaire to the 
person most able to answer, this apparently was not done 
in most cases in which the person responsible for bargaining 
in 1977 and/or 1978 no longer had that responsibility. Some 
recipients were just too busy to take time to answer the 
questionnaire. Follow-up phone calls indicated that in 
several instances individuals were moving offices or for 
some other reason did not have access to the information 
required to complete the questionnaire. Nonetheless, the 
responses which were received provide an adequate overview 
of how well fact-finding is working in Montana.
In examining the effectiveness of fact-finding, data 
was collected with the aim of focusing on three major con­
cepts— that is, whether the fact-finding procedure (1) has 
a positive effect on the collective bargaining process; 
(2) provides adequate deterrents to overdependence on the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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process; and (3) is accepted by the parties as a satisfac­
tory process for resolving their bargaining disputes. For 
each of the three major concepts, certain factors were 
identified which would determine whether or not conditions 
were present which contributed to the effectiveness of fact­
finding .
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RESEARCH FINDINGS
In attempting to determine whether or not the availa­
bility of fact-finding has a positive effect on the col­
lective bargaining process, a number of factors must be 
considered. Is there evidence of "good faith" bargaining 
prior to fact-finding? Are all issues in dispute discussed 
prior to resort to fact-finding? What is the effect of 
mediation prior to fact-finding? In what stage of the
negotiations does most of the "hard bargaining" take place? 
What is the number and the nature of the issues submitted 
to fact-finding? The answers to these questions will indi­
cate whether or not the presence of fact-finding keeps the 
parties from engaging in serious bargaining in the period 
prior to the initiation of the fact-finding procedures.
In studies of fact finding experiences in Wisconsin and 
New York State, it was found that:
Specific examples of employer behavior character­
ized as bargaining in bad faith included using 
procedural technicalities to stall the bargaining 
process and unilaterally granting wage increases 
during negotiations. Undesirable employee behavior 
was sometimes blamed on a tendency to think that 
collective bargaining, along with fact-finding, if 
needed, would solve all the past problems. These 
high expectations led to aggres^^e and sometimes 
unrealistic negotiating demands.
Z ^ w o r d ,  61 .
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Research indicates that in Montana good faith bargaining 
prior to fact-finding was present in most of the cases 
reported- In two cases, unfair labor practice charges were 
prepared by one party but were not filed. In two other 
cases, unfair labor practice charges were filed alleging bad 
faith bargaining but were withdrawn upon settlement of the 
contract. In another case one of the parties filed a number 
of charges but all were dismissed. It can be assumed that 
this activity was in the nature of bargaining strategy by the 
parties rather than any real indication of bad faith. In 
fact, during the time period studied, the Board of Personnel 
Appeals sustained unfair labor practice charges in only one 
case. In this instance, the employer was found to have com­
mitted a number of unfair practices such as engaging in "con­
ditional bargaining," recognizing and bargaining with a rival 
employee organization when there was a real question of 
majority status, and making unilateral changes in working 
conditions that were unsettled points in negotiation. This 
particular contract was still unsettled as of January 1980. 
Bad faith negotiating is often attributed to the parties' 
lack of experience. The fact that in 57 percent of the cases 
examined the parties had been engaging in collective bargain­
ing and reaching agreements for five years or longer proba­
bly accounts for the presence of good faith bargaining.
In the seventeen cases for which this information was 
available, all parties reported that all issues in dispute 
had been discussed prior to the fact-finding process.
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A majority of the parties (81 percent) expressed the 
opinion that the potential of fact-finding had no effect or 
an insubstantial effect on their prior negotiations (see 
Table 1).
TABLE 1
EFFECT OF POSSIBILITY OF FACT-FINDING 
ON PRIOR NEGOTIATIONS
Effect Employers
(%)
Employee
Organizations
(%)
All
Parties
(%)
Substantial . . . . 30 10 19
Insubstantial . . . 30 36 33
No Effect . . . . . 40 54 48
The following statement is representative of the views of
most of the respondents:
I don't think either party gave much thought to 
fact-finding until the fact of impasse developed. 
(Employer)
Employers, more often than did employee organizations,
tended to think that the possibility of fact-finding had a
substantial effect on their prior negotiations. Indicative
of the impact that the potential of fact-finding did have
on some of the parties are the following statements:
From management's standpoint fact-finding serves 
no purpose other than to delay final resolution.
Union membership tends to not settle until all 
third party steps have been used, thinking they 
may receive a few cents more. (Employer)
If any, it chilled the effectiveness of prior 
mediation and apparently limited the number and
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the earnestness (almost pro forma) of bargaining
sessions. (Employee Organization)
A large majority (70 percent) of responding parties 
said that most of the "hard bargaining" in their disputes 
occurred before fact-finding (see Table 2). This indicates 
that the parties are seriously engaging in collective bar­
gaining and that a "chilling effect" is not present because 
of the availability of fact-finding.
TABLE 2
STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS WHERE MOST OF THE 
"HARD BARGAINING" TOOK PLACE
Stage Percent
Before fact-finding .............................  70
During fact-finding .............................  15
After fact-finding .............................  5
Before and during fact-finding ................. 5
Before, during and after fact-finding ..........  5
The number of issues submitted to fact-finding ranged 
from one to seven with the average being three to four and 
the median being three. Hence, the parties are resolving 
most issues in dispute through the collective bargaining 
process prior to fact-finding. The nature of the issues 
submitted to fact-finding is probably more important than 
the number in determining whether or not a "chilling effect" 
is present because of the fact-finding process. The parties 
were asked to list the major issues which were submitted to 
fact-finding (see Table 3). As can be seen from the replies
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of the parties, the major issues submitted to fact finding 
are those which generate deadlocks in the private sector as 
well.
TABLE 3
ISSUES CONSIDERED AS MAJOR 
(BY CASE)
Issue
Wages and salaries ..........
Fringe benefits .............
Work schedule and manpower . .
Management rights ..........
Settlement of disputes . . . .  
Composition of bargaining unit
Subcontracting ...............
Contract dates ...............
Union security (agency shop) .
Total 
(Of 18 Cases)
18
13
11
3
2
2
1
1
1
In the opinion of the parties, mediation prior to fact­
finding by Board of Personnel Appeals staff members does not 
appear to have been very effective (see Table 4). The par­
ties were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of mediation 
prior to fact-finding as a means of (a) reducing the number 
of issues to be submitted to formal fact-finding; (b) nar­
rowing the gap between the parties; and (c) serving as an 
educational process. While it appears that employee organi­
zations view mediation as an effective impasse procedure 
more often than do employers, the failure of this procedure 
to be perceived as effective by a majority of the parties 
may indicate that the parties are, indeed, "holding back"
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until fact-finding. On the other hand, the impressive suc­
cess of mediation prior to fact-finding by the Board of 
Personnel Appeals must also be recognized. During 1977 and 
1978, approximately 105 cases were mediated by the staff of 
the BPA. Of this total, only twenty cases went on to formal 
fact-finding. In other words, prior mediation is successful 
in about 81 percent of the cases which reach deadlock. In 
light of this fact, the negative evaluation of mediation 
by the parties may reflect the inflexibility of their own 
positions and their deadlock more than it does the actual 
effectiveness of the mediation process in relation to the 
fact-finding which follows it.
TABLE 4
EFFECT OF MEDIATION AS REPORTED 
BY FACT-FINDING PARTICIPANTS
Effect Employers
Employee
Organizations Total
Reducing the Number 
of Issues
Substantial............. 22
Insubstantial ..........  33
No Effect............... 44
Narrowing ^ e  Gap Between 
the Parties
Substantial............. 22
Insubstantial ..........  44
No Effect............... 33
Serving as an Education 
Process
Substantial............   22
Insubstantial ..........
No Effect............... 78
25
75
40
40
20
33
56
11
23.5 
53
23.5
32
42
26
28
28
44
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Thus, research findings are inconclusive concerning 
whether or not mediation prior to fact-finding is hindered 
by the availability of fact-finding procedures. But re­
search does indicate that (1) good faith bargaining is 
present prior to and during fact-finding in a significant 
majority of cases; (2) all issues in dispute are discussed 
prior to resort to fact-finding and the potential of fact­
finding has little effect on prior negotiations; (3) major 
issues submitted to fact-finding are the same as those which 
lead to deadlock in the private sector; and (4) most of the 
serious bargaining takes place before fact-finding is intro­
duced. Thus, it appears that fact-finding does not have a 
negative effect on public employee collective bargaining in 
Montana.
Three major deterrents to the utilization of fact­
finding can be identified. These are the investment of time 
and money and the fear of adverse public opinion. The 
opinion of the parties is the most important factor in deter­
mining whether or not these three truly do deter employers 
and employee organizations from resorting to the use of the 
fact-finding procedure too frequently.
Cost appears to be no deterrent at all to invoking the
fact-finding procedure in Montana. Most states divide the
25cost of fact-finding between the parties. In Montana, it
Edward B. Krinsky, "Public Employment Fact-Finding 
in Fourteen States," Labor Law Journal, (September, 1966), 
540.
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is split three ways among the parties and the Board of Per­
sonnel Appeals. The BPA maintains a list of fact finders 
from which the parties are supplied with a list of five, 
one of which is selected by them as the fact finder in their 
dispute. The BPA sets the fact finders’ fee at $100.00 per 
day for hearings and preparation of the report, plus expen­
ses incurred. The parties also have the option of mutually 
agreeing upon any qualified fact finder of their choice 
without requesting a list from the BPA. But in such a case, 
it is the policy of the BPA that its share of the cost is 
based on what its share would be of the maximum fee of 
$100.00 per day, the parties picking up the remaining cost 
if the fact finder they select charges more than that fee.
During the time period studied, the parties' share of 
fact-finding costs ranged from $71.57 up to $640.09. The 
average cost was $191.25 and the median cost was $142.86. 
Not one responding party stated that cost would deter them 
from utilizing fact-finding again in the future. Of course, 
it is possible, since only those parties who proceeded to 
fact-finding were questioned, that some unions accepted 
management's last offer rather than incur the cost of fact­
finding. There did not appear to be any evidence that the 
present fee schedule is so low that the parties are unduly 
attracted to the procedure. On the other hand, the fee and 
the total cost are apparently not so high that they act as 
a deterrent.
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Time invested in pursuing the process also does not 
seem to serve as a deterrent. In the cases examined, the 
time from the beginning of negotiations until declaration 
of a deadlock ranged from ten days to eight months, the 
average time being about three months. The total time from 
the beginning of negotiations until the date of the issuance 
of the fact finder's report ranged from 43 days to eleven 
months, the average time being about six months. Thus, the 
parties spent about as much time utilizing the impasse pro­
cedures to resolve their disputes as they spent bargaining 
up until the time a deadlock was declared. It is also 
interesting to note that the law states that upon completion 
of the hearing, "but no later than 20 days from the day of 
appointment," the fact finder should make his report. 
Nevertheless, the average time between the date the fact 
finder was appointed and and the date the report was issued 
was thirty-two days. In fact, in only two of the thirteen 
cases reported did the fact finder meet the twenty-day dead­
line. The important point here is that the statutory time 
limits regarding the issuance of the report and/or its pub­
lication may be extended if the parties jointly agree. It 
appears that time did not impose any significant constraint 
upon the parties in the cases studied.
Theoretically, uncertainty as to public opinion is 
also assumed to act as a deterrent and to encourage the par­
ties to negotiate a settlement before the introduction of 
fact-finding. Although fact-finding as originally designed
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was intended to result in thoughtful public opinion which 
would induce the parties ultimately to accept the recom­
mendations of an impartial third party, it would appear that 
such opinion has played a minimal role in the fact-finding 
process in Montana. In only three cases were the proceed­
ings attended by the public and/or the press. In the opin­
ion of the participants, public and press attendance helped 
achieve settlement in one case, hindered the achievement of 
a settlement in another, and had no effect in the third. In 
one additional case, the press attended a post-hearing meet­
ing of the parties at which the fact finder discussed and 
explained his report. In this case, there was a strike in 
progress and the fact finder believed that the attendance of 
the press helped achieve settlement.
The responses from the participants concerning the 
presence of public interest in the proceedings were often 
varied concerning the same case. That is, sometimes one 
party reported that there was public interest in a case 
while the other party reported none. In some instances, the 
fact finder reported public interest in a case while the 
parties did not. Since it is the parties' perception of 
public interest which would act as a deterrent, it seems 
best to present the results in those terms. Of the respond­
ing parties, employee organizations perceived public 
interest to be present more often than did employers. Ten 
employers responded to the question of whether or not there 
was general public interest in the fact-finding proceedings.
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Seven employers answered "no" to this question while three 
answered "yes." Nine unions responded to the same question. 
Five unions reported that there was public interest in the 
fact-finding proceedings, three said there was no public 
interest and one answered "don’t know." In only five cases 
were responses received from both parties to the dispute. 
Furthermore, in only one instance did both parties agree 
on their response to the public interest question; they 
both said there was no general public interest in their 
case. In the other four cases, one party perceived that 
public interest was present while the other did not.
In those instances where public pressure was exerted 
(out of a total of nineteen cases reported), the means used 
to exert pressure were through newspapers (31.5 percent), 
other news media (18 percent), community pressure groups 
(18 percent) and political channels (10.5 percent). All of 
the participants agreed that the public pressure which was 
exerted was on both of the parties equally and, if on just 
one party, then on the employer (see Table 5).
TABLE 5 
PUBLIC PRESSURE EXERTED
Extent of Pressure Percent
Solely on employer.. ............................  8
Mostly on e m p l o y e r .............................  31
Equally on both parties.........................  46
Mostly on employee organizations ...............  15
Solely on employee organizations ..............
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The effect of this public pressure, though, was insub­
stantial or nonexistent. In fact, in only one case did the 
parties report that public pressure had a substantial effect 
on helping them to achieve settlement. It is interesting to 
note that this case is one in which fact-finding was not 
utilized even though recommended by a Board of Personnel 
Appeals mediator. It involved police and was settled after 
a strike. These factors no doubt contributed to the extent 
of the public pressure applied. In general, although the 
parties may perceive some public interest in fact-finding 
in Montana, the public interest does not generate substan­
tial enough pressure on the parties to affect their actions 
or to act as a deterrent to fact-finding.
In summary, research indicates that there do not appear 
to be sufficient deterrents to overdependency on fact­
finding in Montana. On the other hand, the fact that twenty 
cases were submitted to fact-finding in this two-year period, 
out of the hundreds of contracts negotiated, does not appear 
to demonstrate an overdependency on the process, even for a 
state with Montana's small population. A possible explana­
tion is that the right of Montana's public employees to 
strike also acts as a deterrent to the use of fact-finding. 
Parties may settle prior to fact-finding because they know 
that, should fact-finding fail, they would be faced with a 
strike situation. This knowledge could act as an even 
stronger deterrent than the fear of adverse public opinion 
or the investment of time and money.
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Another issue which must be considered in evaluating 
the effectiveness of fact-finding is the acceptability of 
the process to the parties. The role of the fact finder can 
play an important part in contributing to this acceptance.
A number of factors help determine how the fact finder's 
role relates to acceptability. What is the intent of the 
fact finder's recommendation, a basis for settlement or a 
guideline for further bargaining? What criteria are used 
by fact finders in writing their recommendations? What is 
the fact finder's perception of the acceptability of his 
report? What attempts are made by the fact finder to re­
solve the issues in dispute?
First of all, as stated previously, it is reasonable 
to assume that most fact finders are concerned with accep­
tance by the parties when they write their recommendations. 
Montana fact finders apparently try to make recommendations 
which serve as a basis for settlement as well as guidelines 
for further negotiations should the recommendations not 
be accepted. In 77 percent of the cases, fact finders 
reported that their recommendations were intended to serve 
as the basis for settlement on all issues in dispute. In 
the remaining 23 percent of the cases, the recommendations 
were intended to serve as a basis for settlement on the major 
issues only. In 79 percent of the cases, fact finders re­
ported that their recommendations were intended to establish 
guidelines for further negotiations on all issues in dispute 
while in 21 percent their recommendations were intended to
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establish guidelines on major issues only. A large majority 
of the fact finders reported that they considered all the 
issues in dispute in their reports.
After listening to each side present its position on 
the issues in dispute and determining the facts of the case, 
the fact finder must make a judgment concerning the final 
disposition of each issue. Although some state laws speci­
fy the criteria that fact finders must consider in for­
mulating their recommendations, this is not the case in 
Montana. In this study, the fact finders reported that the 
criteria used most frequently in writing their recommenda­
tions were "acceptability," "equity," and "ability to pay" 
(see Table 6).
TABLE 6
CRITERIA USED BY FACT FINDERS 
IN FORMULATING RECOMMENDATIONS
No. of cases
Criteria in which used
Acceptability.................................... 10
E q u i t y ..........................................  10
Ability to p a y .................................. 10
Practicality of implementation ................. 8
Comparability .................................... 8
Cost of l i v i n g .................................. 8
Compromise ...................................... 7
Other:
Legislative intent in applying salary schedules 1
The use of the "acceptability" criterion indicates that 
the fact finder wrote recommendations which he believed 
would be accepted by the parties. If he applied the "equity"
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criterion, the fact finder made recommendations which he 
believed to be fair and just, without taking into account 
whether or not the parties would in reality find them to be 
acceptable, rather in the manner of the arbitrator. The 
fact finder who applied the "ability to pay" criterion based 
his decision on the employer's ability (or inability) to 
financially meet the wage demands of the employee organiza­
tion. (Wages were in dispute in every case reported in 
this study.) Use of the "practicality of implementation" 
criterion by a fact finder indicates that he took into con­
sideration the practicality (or impracticality) of implement­
ing a proposal, aside from its other positive or negative 
qualities. If a fact finder applied the "comparability" 
criterion, he used, as a standard of judgment, comparisons 
of the parties (usually the employee organization) to other 
similar groups in different geographical areas, in terms of 
economic position or possession of certain benefits. A fact 
finder who utilized the "cost of living" criterion tried to 
determine, and to reflect in his recommendation, a wage 
increase that would keep pace with the cost of living. As 
Yaffe and Goldblatt point out, the "compromise" criterion 
may be distinguished from the "acceptability" criterion in 
that it usually connotes a "splitting of the difference" 
without taking into account the power relationship between 
the p a r t i e s . I n  other words, when using the "compromise"
^^Yaffe and Goldblatt, p. 51,
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criterion, a fact finder made recommendations which required 
concessions equally by both parties. By contrast, when 
using the "acceptability" criterion, the fact finder made 
recommendations based on his knowledge of the highest pri­
orities of both sides and the proposals each side might be 
willing to sacrifice. Many fact finders applied more than 
one of these criteria in a single case but the majority 
indicated that "acceptability" was the most important 
criterion in the development of their recommendations (see 
Table 7).
TABLE 7
MOST IMPORTANT CRITERIA 
IN FORMULATING RECOMMENDATIONS
Most Important Criterion No. of Cases
Acceptability ......................................  8
Practicality of implementation.....................  2
Equity ............................................  2
Comparability ......................................  1
Compromise ........................................  1
Cost of l i v i n g .................................... 1
Ability to p a y .................................... 0
Further evidence is available that Montana fact finders at­
tempt to formulate recommendations that are acceptable to the 
parties in that the great majority (86 percent) stated that 
their recommendations were written either "solely for the 
parties" or "mostly for the parties, but also for the com­
munity." Fourteen percent stated that their recommendations 
were written "equally for the parties and the community."
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Fourteen percent stated that their recommendations were 
written "equally for the parties and the community." It 
appears that Montana fact finders are convinced that their 
main goal is to achieve settlement of disputes by encourag­
ing the parties themselves to reach agreement based upon 
the recommendations of the fact finders.
Overall, the fact finders were not particularly confi­
dent that the parties would accept their recommendations in 
total. Twenty-three percent of the fact finders were confi­
dent that the employee organizations would accept all of the 
report, while only twenty-one percent were confident that 
the employers would accept the total report. On the other 
hand, 75 percent of the fact finders were confident that 
both the employee organizations and the employers would 
accept at least part of the report. Overall, the fact 
finders were more confident of the acceptability of their 
recommendations by the employee organizations than by the 
employers.
In the three cases in which the fact finders were confi­
dent that the employee organizations would accept the total 
report and in the three different cases in which they were 
confident that the employers would accept the total report, 
the parties did accept the total report in each instance. 
It is interesting to note that in all of the aforementioned 
cases but one the fact finder initially attempted to mediate 
the dispute, or at least made some informal attempts to 
help the parties reach a settlement prior to initiating more
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formal fact-finding procedures. As noted in the discussion 
of the Montana Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act, 
fact finders are not prohibited from attempting to mediate a 
settlement of the dispute. Overall, fact finders reported 
that they mediated, or informally tried to help the parties 
settle the dispute, in 60 percent of the cases. In three 
cases, fact finders were successful in their attempts at 
mediation and a settlement was reached voluntarily by the 
parties without the necessity of the issuance of a fact­
finding report. The other fact finders who reported that 
they made attempts at mediation stated that they spent an 
average of 27 percent of their time mediating during the 
fact-finding hearing.
The parties were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the fact finders’ attempts at mediation during the course of 
fact-finding hearings. One hundred percent of the respond­
ing parties stated that the fact finder's attempt to mediate 
had no effect or an insubstantial effect on reducing the 
number of issues in dispute and on narrowing the gap between 
•^e parties. Twenty-five percent of the parties responded 
that the mediation attempt by the fact finder had a substan­
tial effect in terms of serving as an educational process, 
while 75 percent stated that the effects were insubstantial 
in this area. In comparison, the fact finders themselves 
were of the opinion that their attempts at resolving the 
disputes informally during the fact-finding proceedings were 
generally successful (see Table 8 for a comparison of the
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opinions of the parties and the fact finders regarding the 
effectiveness of mediation).
TABLE 8
EFFECT OF MEDIATION DURING FACT-FINDING
Opinion of Opinion of
Effect Parties Fact Finders
(%) (%)
Reducing the Number 
of Issues
Substantial ............ —  — 60
Insubstantial .......... 50 20
No Effect ............... 50 20
Narrowing the Gap Between 
the Parties
Substantial ............ — 40
Insubstantial .......... 75 20
No Effect ............... 25 20
Serving as an Education 
Process
Substantial ............ 25 83
Insubstantial .......... 75 17
No Effect ...............
Interpreting the research findings regarding the effective­
ness of mediation by the fact finders is somewhat difficult 
because of conflicting responses to the questionnaires. In 
a number of cases, the fact finder reported that he made 
attempts at mediation but the parties to the dispute report­
ed that he did not. In other cases, the parties reported 
that the fact finder attempted to mediate their dispute 
while the fact finder reported making no such attempt. 
Finally, in some cases, the parties to the dispute disagreed 
about whether or not the fact finder attempted to mediate.
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Nonetheless, in five out of six cases in which the fact 
finder reported making an attempt at mediation, both employ­
ers and employee organizations reported accepting the final 
recommendations of the fact finders. This may indicate that 
mediation attempts by the fact finders were more effective 
in contributing to the eventual acceptance of the recom­
mendations by the parties, and the settlement of the dispute, 
than the parties actually perceived or reported.
The expertise of fact finders is an important factor 
which cannot be overlooked. Several responding parties 
rated the effectiveness of fact-finding very low because of 
what they perceived to be a lack of expertise on the part of 
the fact finder.
The fact-finding didn’t seem to do any good be­
cause the fact finder decided in favor of the city 
on all major issues but the city agreed to all 
union original proposals. This fact finder, in my 
opinion, cannot be considered impartial because of 
the report he turned in. I have never seen so 
many misread and misunderstood and maybe just 
ignored facts in any report. The union presented 
signed documents by the city that supported the 
union's case and the fact finder ignored these.
In my opinion, the fact-finding was a waste of 
both parties’ time and money. (Employee Organiza­
tion)
Fact-finding should be more effective in other 
situations. In this case, both sides felt the 
fact finder failed to grasp the issue and his 
recommendation that the parties seek an Attorney 
General’s opinion on the legality of the pay plan 
was inappropriate and not accepted by either side. 
(Employer)
This fact finder didn’t really understand the 
issues. His recommendations made little sense. 
However, by accident he supported management’s 
position without really understanding why. Since 
the difference in positions was only 10* per hour
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for four employees, the union had little choice 
but to accept. The fact finder wrote a thirty 
page report on this one issue. It contained a 
tremendous amount of unnecessary detail and 
information, including some pretty dubious recom­
mendations concerning the school district's use 
of a professional negotiator. We think he ran 
up the work, and thus the cost, beyond necessity. 
(Employer)
The legislature realized the necessity for skilled fact 
finders and in 1977 directed the Board of Personnel Appeals 
to establish a course of education for the training of 
fact finders and arbitrators. No person may serve as a 
fact finder or as an arbitrator under the Montana Public 
Employees Collective Bargaining Act unless he or she has
successfully completed this course, which is conducted by 
BPA staff and other professionals in the field of labor 
relations, or equivalent training.
The major factor which helps to ascertain the acceptance 
of the fact-finding process is the acceptance or rejection 
of the fact finder's report by the parties. Information 
regarding acceptance of the fact finder's recommendations
was reported for thirteen employers and thirteen employee 
organizations. Sixty-nine percent of both groups reported 
accepting the fact finder's recommendations. It was possible 
to determine the actions of both parties in the same case 
in ten instances. Of this number, both parties accepted 
the fact finder's recommendations in four cases and at least 
one party accepted them in five cases. In only one case
did both parties reject the fact finder's recommendations.
In cases in which one or both parties did not accept the
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recommendations, they were asked to state their reasons for 
rejection (see Table 9). Employee organizations cited "lack 
of equity" most often as the reason for rejection while 
employers cited "impracticality of implementation."
TABLE 9
PARTIES' REASONS 
FOR REJECTING RECOMMENDATIONS
No. of Cases 
Reason Employee
Organizations Employers
Lack of e<piity..........   4 2
"Out of line" with comparable
a r e a s   3 1
Impracticality of implementation 2 3
Membership rejected ..........  3
Inability to p a y   —  1
Finally, the parties and fact finders were asked to 
evaluate the overall effectiveness of fact-finding in the 
particular case in which they were involved (see Tables 10 
and 11).
TABLE 10
PARTIES' EVALUATION OF FACT-FINDING
Employee
Organizations Employers Total
(%) (%) (%)
Very Effective . . .  30 50 39
Not Very Effective . 40 —  22
Ineffective . . . .  30 37.5 33
U n c e r t a i n   —  12.5 6
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TA BLE  11
FACT FINDERS' EVALUATION OF FACT-FINDING
Evaluation Percent
Very Effective.................................... 31
E f f e c t i v e ........................................  31
Not Very Effective................................ 7
Ineffective ......................................
U n c e r t a i n ........................................  31
As can be seen from the tables above, while employers 
rated fact-finding higher than did employee organizations, 
only 39 percent of the parties reported that fact-finding 
had been effective in settling their dispute. On the other 
hand, 62 percent of the fact finders stated that fact-finding 
had been effective or even very effective in resolving the 
impasse. It is understandable that the fact finders, after 
having worked hard at their assignment, would not tend to 
think their efforts had been in vain. It should also be 
noted that almost one-third of the fact finders reported 
being somewhat uncertain about how effective their efforts 
actually were.
A final caveat regarding the acceptance of fact-finding
reports was discussed by Gatewood in his Wisconsin study:
. . .  a criterion of effectiveness predicated upon 
the assumption that either full or partial accep­
tance of awards implies general acceptance of 
factfinding, while intuitively appealing, may not 
be the best standard. The problem stems from the 
assumption that partially accepted awards support 
the notion of acceptance of the procedure . . .
On the other hand, it may be argued that only the
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complete rejection of awards would legitimately 
imply non-acceptance of the procedure. Therefore 
although partial acceptance of awards has contri­
buted to a decline in interest in the procedure, 
this does not connote non-acceptance _of fact­
finding as dispute resolution procedure.
It may be helpful then also to note the relation of the 
parties' acceptance or rejection of the fact finders' recom­
mendations to their opinion of the effectiveness of the pro­
cedure. One hundred percent of both employers and employee 
organizations who rejected the fact finder's report rated 
fact-finding as "ineffective." Of the employers who ac­
cepted the fact finders' recommendations, two-thirds said 
fact-finding was "very effective." Of the remaining one- 
third, one employer was uncertain as to the effect and one 
expressed dissatisfaction with the fact finder's report even 
though accepting the recommendations. Of the unions which 
accepted the fact finder's report, two-thirds said fact­
finding was "not very effective" while one-third rated it as 
"very effective." It appears, then, that employee organiza­
tions are generally more critical of the process than are 
employers, even when accepting the report. Employers, on 
the other hand, appear to judge fact-finding effective only 
when the fact finder's recommendations are to their liking. 
The final conclusion must be that the parties are not over­
whelmingly convinced that fact-finding is an acceptable 
procedure for resolving disputes in contract negotiations.
^^Gatewood, 50.
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CASE STUDY
Gilroy noted in his review of public employment impasse 
resolution procedures that "the effectiveness of fact­
finding is very difficult to measure" because "the process 
is fluid" and that "there has been no accurate manner to 
standardize the process of review and analysis." The 
main ingredient in evaluating whether or not fact-finding is 
an effective procedure in the end boils down to whether or 
not the participants accept it as a procedure that satis­
factorily resolves disputes. This is a standard which does 
not easily lend itself to accurate measurement. For this 
reason, an in-depth look at one of the fact-finding cases 
which occurred during the time period studied may help pro­
vide a better understanding of the fact-finding procedure, 
as well as highlight the subjective factors which make the 
effectiveness of the process so difficult to evaluate.
In the case examined, the employer is the City of
Helena. The Union is the International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local 231. The bargain­
ing unit represented by the Machinists Union consists of
all eligible mechanics, welders, partsmen and service
Z^Gilroy, 501.
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maintenance men employed by the City of Helena at the City 
Shop. The unit consists of eight members. This is a very 
small portion of the almost two hundred total employees of 
the City. Only about 30 percent of the employees of the 
City are unionized. Besides the Machinists, this number 
includes the police, firemen and the laborers in several 
city departments.
At the time of this series of bargaining sessions, the 
parties had bargained three previous contracts. The Board 
of Personnel Appeals mediator in this case stated that the 
parties were fairly sophisticated and knew what they were 
doing at the bargaining table.
The parties first met on April 19, 1977, to open nego­
tiations on a new contract and had five meetings over the 
next several weeks. About eighteen major sections of the 
contract were opened for negotiations. About half of the 
issues were initially opened by the City and half by the 
Union. In addition, the Union proposed adding a new section 
on longevity pay.
In late May or early June, a Board of Personnel Appeals 
mediator was called in to help the parties reach a settle­
ment . He met with the parties five times. As noted above, 
the parties were experienced in collective bargaining so the 
mediation did not serve as any type of education process. 
The City stated that mediation somewhat reduced the number 
of issues to be submitted to fact-finding and narrowed the 
gap between the parties, while the Union said that the
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effect of mediation was insubstantial in those areas. The 
mediator's perception was that the key issue, wages, re­
mained outstanding because the gap between the parties on 
this issue was so extreme.
With the contract between the parties slated to expire 
at midnight on Thursday, June 30, 1977, a fact-finding hear­
ing was held on Tuesday, June 28. The Union had voted to 
strike at a meeting held on the previous Monday.
Thirteen issues had been settled by the time the fact 
finder arrived on the scene, leaving five major issues and 
one minor issue remaining to be resolved. The minor issue 
was the duration of the agreement. The City had proposed a 
two-year contract while the Union preferred a length of one 
year. The five major issues concerned wages, fringe bene­
fits and settlement of disputes. The monetary cost of the 
Union's demands at the point of fact-finding amounted to an 
increase of 90<? per hour broken down as follows:
W a g e s ................... 46Ç per hour
Health Program...........24* per hour (total
family coverage— $85.51 
per month maximum)
Longevity P a y  14* per hour
Tool Allowance........  6* per hour
The City's last offer was a dollar amount equivalent to an 
increase of 34* per hour which the Union could allocate at 
its discretion. The Union's demands translated to a 17.37 
percent increase, and the offer of the City to a 6.5 percent 
increase.
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The contract which expired on June 30 called for dis­
putes going beyond the City Manager level to be handled by 
the Employee Grievance Board. The three-member Civil 
Service Commission, appointed by the City Commissioners, 
served as the Employee Grievance Board. The decision of 
this board was final. The City was satisfied with this 
procedure and wished to retain it. The Union proposed 
instead a Conference Committee, three members of which would 
be appointed by each party. If this committee could not 
agree upon a satisfactory solution, then the dispute would 
be submitted to binding arbitration.
Since it seemed improbable that a meaningful report 
could be prepared, distributed and considered before the 
July 1 strike deadline set by the Union, the fact finder 
made an effort to convince the Union to extend the deadline. 
But the parties could not agree on the retroactivity aspects 
of the ultimate agreement and so the Union went on strike as 
expected on July 1, 1977.
The fact finder reported that at the beginning of the 
hearing he explored the feasibility of mediation but soon 
concluded that the Board of Personnel Appeals mediator had 
capably exhausted that avenue on all issues which were 
amenable to mediation. The parties were in agreement that 
this attempt at mediation was generally ineffective, al­
though the City did state that it helped to narrow the gap 
between the parties.
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The fact finder made the following recommendations in 
his report dated July 6, 1977;
W a g e s ...................30<? per hour increase
Health Program ..........  Increase to $50-00 per
month maximum
Longevity P a y .......... $2.00 per each year
worked per month paid 
after the third year of 
employment
Tool Allowance.......... No change— as in expired
contract
Settlement of Disputes . . No change—  as in expired
contract
The fact finder's rationale for the wage recommendation 
was based on a comparison of wages paid machinists in the 
private sector in the City of Helena, in other cities around 
the state, and in various departments of state government. 
The fact finder found that these comparisons indicated that 
the Union was lagging behind other jurisdictions and that 
they supported the recommended wage increase.
Since the City had offered $50.00 per month maximum for 
health insurance coverage to the Union at one time during 
negotiations and since all non-union City employees were 
scheduled to receive this benefit beginning July 1, 1977,
the fact finder stated that he believed his recommendation 
was a reasonable one although well below the Union's demand.
The fact finder recommended the inclusion of longevity 
pay in the contract as a well-recognized device designed 
to reward and retain loyal and experienced employees. He
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believed that the City had accepted this concept in princi­
ple when it offered, during the course of prior negotiations, 
$1.00 per each year worked per month paid after the third 
year of employment in response to the Union's demand of 
$5.00 per each year worked per month paid. The fact finder 
stated that his recommendation was a reasonable starting 
point, expecting that increases would be negotiated from 
time to time, once longevity pay became a part of the con­
tract.
Since it was not common practice in the area for the 
employer to provide an allowance for the purchase of tools 
by the employee, the fact finder did not find an increase in 
the tool allowance to be justified.
While recognizing that binding arbitration is an effec­
tive and widely used procedure for settling disputes and 
might well have a place in some future contract between the 
parties, the fact finder did not think a convincing argument 
had been made for its inclusion. The Union conceded that no 
real problems had arisen with the dispute settlement pro­
cedure to date and the fact finder did not think that the 
procedure's merit or efficiency had been adequately tested.
The report of the fact finder was accepted by the City 
but not by the Union. Cited, in order of importance, as 
reasons for the rejection by the Union were (1) the member­
ship rejected the report; (2) the recommendations were "out 
of line" with comparable areas; and (3) the report demon­
strated a lack of equity.
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During a July 7 meeting to discuss the report, the 
Union accepted the fact finder's recommendations on health 
insurance, tool allowance and the settlement of disputes, 
leaving only wages and longevity pay still in dispute. The 
contract was finally settled on July 9 after mediation by 
telephone conducted by the fact finder. The final settlement 
in relation to the proposals of the parties and the fact 
finder's report is outlined in Tables 12 and 13.
TABLE 12 
UNION AND CITY PROPOSALS
Issue Union City
W a g e s ............................  46<?
Health P r o g r a m .................  244 344
Longevity P a y .................... 144
Tool A l l o w a n c e ..................  64
Settlement of Disputes . . . .  Binding Arb No Change
Total 904 384
Increase 17.37% 6.5%
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TA B LE  13
RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINAL SETTLEMENT
Fact Final
Issue Finder Settlement
Wages . . . .  .................. 304= 324
Health Program . . . . . . . .  124 124
Longevity P a y ....................  94* 84*
Tool Allowance ............... No Change No Change
Settlement of Disputes . . . .  No Change No Change
Total 514 524
Increase 8.88% 9.5%
*$50.00 per month maximum 
**$2.00 per each year worked per month paid 
***$1.75 per each year worked per month paid
This case generally reflects the major findings re­
ported in the overall study. There does not appear to have 
been a negative effect on negotiations in this case. Both 
parties reported that the "hard bargaining" took place
before fact-finding (although the Union representative said 
the Union had to bargain hard before fact-finding to keep 
what it had and then had to bargain hard during fact-finding 
to get what it wanted!). Generally, good faith bargaining 
appears to have been present.
Public interest in this case seems to have been totally 
absent until a strike became imminent. At that time, news 
articles began appearing in the local paper. Neither party
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perceived that there was any real public interest or that 
any public pressure was exerted.
An examination of the opinions of the parties involved 
perhaps sheds the most light on the effectiveness of fact­
finding in this specific case, as well as on the effective­
ness of the process in general. The City, as noted, accep­
ted the fact finder's report and also rated fact-finding as 
very effective in helping to achieve a settlement. The City 
representative believed that the fact finder's report was 
reasonable and that the fact finder did a good job. The 
City accepted the report because it was believed that if the 
Union did not accept it, the City would have the tactical 
advantage. The City representative believed that if the 
Union continued to hold out, in the face of the fact 
finder's recommendations, the City could then pressure the 
Union to settle by informing the public of the Union's re­
fusal to accept the fact finder's report. Theoretically, 
in fact-finding public interest is supposed to be spon­
taneously brought to bear upon the parties in response to 
the publication of the recommendations of the fact finder. 
But the City representative pointed out that this usually 
is not the case in real life. Therefore, the party which 
wishes to use public interest as a pressure tactic must 
conduct a public relations campaign to generate public 
interest in and support for its particular position. In 
cases in which the gap between the parties is extreme, the 
role of public interest may be more significant than it
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might seem at first glance. Parties may not often perceive 
any great public interest in their negotiations, but the 
knowledge that public interest might be generated as a tac­
tic by the opposing party could cause the recalcitrant party 
to feel some pressure to settle. Spero and Capozzola point 
out that ". . . a prime advantage of fact-finding is that
insubstantial or extreme demands tend to lose their force in 
29this forum." Thus, even if there is no public interest 
at all in the dispute, the mere publication of extreme pro­
posals or rigid positions of one party or the other may 
cause the party to reevaluate is position.
The Union, on the other hand, rejected the fact finder's 
recommendations and rated fact-finding as ineffective in 
this case. The Union spokesman is an International Repre­
sentative for the Machinists Union. He negotiates about one 
hundred contracts per year. Of this number, only eleven 
contracts are in the public sector while the remainder are 
with private sector employers. As can be expected, the 
Union representative is impatient with the public sector 
impasse procedures. He views fact-finding as "just another 
step we have to go through." Even though he is impatient 
with the public sector procedures, he does not think that 
strikes in the public sector have the significant effect 
they do in the private sector. In his view, fact-finding is 
not as effective in settling disputes as is the tenacity and
29Spero and Capozzola, 284.
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perseverance of the parties— how long the Union members are 
willing to hold out on the picket line. But tax monies are 
not like corporation profits. They keep rolling in even 
though the employees are on strike. Since Unions do not 
find public sector strikes effective in most cases, the 
Machinists' representative favors binding arbitration as a 
means of settling bargaining disputes. Changing attitudes 
may also be affecting public employers. Employers are 
becoming more willing to "take" a strike because, through 
utilizing efficient management techniques, they are able to 
continue to deliver services during a strike and even save 
money at the same time. Indeed, the City representative in 
this case described various "strike plans" that the City 
Management devised even before negotiations started. In 
the case of the strike by the Machinists, the unionized 
laborers honored the picket lines. Thus City management 
personnel was called upon to drive garbage trucks to insure 
continuation of city services. The Machinists' representa­
tive was of the opinion that unions would receive more 
favorable decisions from arbitrators settling disputes 
through binding arbitration than they are receiving from 
fact finders. His complaint was that fact finders do not 
delve deep enough into such issues as wage comparisons, 
budgets, cost of living, and so on.
The fact finder in this case rated fact-finding as 
very effective in helping to reach a settlement. This 
fact finder stated, partially because his report is
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recommendatory in nature and not binding, he feels more 
comfortable in a mediation-like atmosphere rather than a 
formal hearing. This allows him to ascertain the real 
priorities of the parties and to determine the intensity of 
their positions which then gives him a better idea of what 
will be acceptable. In this case, the final settlement 
was only a penny more than what he had recommended, so it 
appears that the fact finder did a good job of judging 
acceptability.
The fact finder pointed out that there may be factors, 
other than the issues under negotiation, which contribute to 
the extreme gaps between parties which lead to deadlocks. 
The attitudes of the participants may stand in the way of 
agreement. Especially in the public sector, employers have 
not yet accepted the idea of unions and collective bargain­
ing in many locales. Sometimes union representatives want 
to put on a show at the bargaining table to further their 
own position, or they are guided by other considerations 
relating to internal union politics. Management repre­
sentatives might also be motivated by personal ambition. 
Sometimes there are personality conflicts between the 
representatives at the bargaining table. While the monetary 
issues did play a significant part in the deadlock between 
the Machinists and the City of Helena, it appears that some 
type of attitudinal blocks also may have been present. The 
City representative characterized himself a number of times 
as "strong management" oriented. The Union representative
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evidenced some bitterness at the general lack of support for 
labor in Helena and mentioned that several items being bar­
gained for by the Machinists, longevity pay and increased 
health insurance, had already been given to non-unionized 
employees of the City while his union had to bargain to 
impasse for them.
The fact finder pointed out that he believed that fact­
finding is effective because it provides another chance for 
the parties to come together at the table and resolve their 
dispute. He also noted that it provides a chance for the 
parties to "save face." When one party or the other, for 
whatever reason, continues to make extreme proposals or 
continues an unyielding position, the fact-finding process 
may allow the recalcitrant party to back down and still 
retain some dignity. For example, the representative of an 
employee organization who continues, during the course of 
bargaining, to threaten a strike unless a high wage demand 
is met has also had to convince his constituents that this 
course of action is in the best interest of the members of 
the employee organization. He does this so that he will be 
sure of their continued support, even though he may know it 
is an unreasonable demand. A fact-finding report which 
recommends a more reasonable wage increase can be used by 
the bargainer to convince his constituents that the recom­
mended amount is, indeed, perhaps the best they can expect. 
The blame for not winning the high wage demand is then de­
flected from the bargainer to the fact finder and/or the
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fact-finding process. But in any case, the dispute is 
settled.
While fact-finding was not effective in forestalling a 
strike in this case, the strike was probably of considerably 
shorter duration than it would have been without the availa­
bility of fact-finding, given the wide gap between the par­
ties. Since prior mediation seems to have been utilized to 
the utmost and there still remained that broad gap between 
the parties, it may be that fact-finding was successful for 
the very reason cited above. It provided an opportunity for 
the parties to come together one more time and to "save 
face." The Union gave up its demands concerning the settle­
ment of disputes and tool allowance while getting a little 
more in wages and fringe benefits. The City was able to 
preserve the status quo in certain areas by giving a little 
more money.
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CONCLUSION
William E. Simkin, a champion of mediation, has pointed 
out one of the problems being faced more and more often in 
fact-findng:
In many jurisdictions, public employee wages and 
some working conditions have lagged so far behind 
comparable private wages and practices that a re­
port acceptable to employees has been likely. As 
public employees close the gap, it will be increas­
ingly difficult to develop recommendations that 
are acceptable to both sides. In other words, 
fact-finding will continue to be important in 
the public sector as a reluctant step beyond 
mediation, but mutual acceptability will be 
increasingly hard to obtain.
This appears to be the case in Montana, although compared to
the experiences in other states, fact-finding is working
well in this state. Fact-finding scores high in that it
has a positive effect on the collective bargaining process.
On the other hand, there do not appear to be adequate
deterrents to its use, although in actual practice there
does not seem to be an overdependency on fact-finding.
In terms of bargaining theory, the fact-finding process
in Montana seems to raise the cost of continuing the
dispute higher than the cost of making a compromise or
^^Simkin, p. 349.
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a concession. By doing so, fact-finding helps to encourage 
settlement.
Fact-finding’s biggest failing appears to be in its
acceptance by the parties, 55 percent of which rate it as
not very effective or ineffective. While 50 percent of the
parties accepted the fact finders' recommendations, many
appeared to have done so grudgingly. This is reflected in
some of the comments of the respondents:
I feel that fact-finding as it exists is ineffec­
tive and as long as it remains a statutory pro­
vision, it serves only as a delay factor for 
the unions. (Employer)
. . . fact-finding is costly, useless and time
consuming . . .It has been used many times with
favorable results in other states. Apparently 
there is no public interest in Montana. (Employee 
Organization)
I feel that fact-finding should precede mediation 
if possible. (Employer)
I personally would like to see fact-finding taken 
out. I think it’s a waste of time and money. It 
serves to let the employer have a month or two to 
stall and use the money which should be in the 
men's pocket. (Employee Organization)
This dissatisfaction with fact-finding may be reflected 
in some options to the present impasse resolution procedures 
which are appearing in Montana. During the summer of 1979, 
for the first time, a public employer and a labor organiza­
tion opted to submit their contract dispute to final and
binding arbitration. A bill providing for compulsory inter­
est arbitration in fire fighters collective bargaining was 
passed in the last Montana legislative session. Especially 
in the light of these events, it is important that we
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understand the limitations and potential of the current 
impasse resolution procedures as well as all of the availa­
ble options— binding arbitration, fact-finding followed by 
mediation, "med-arb," arbitration followed by negotiations 
and so on. The more we learn, the more we probably will be 
convinced of the futility of searching for the "one best 
way" for resolving all collective bargaining disputes. 
Instead we will become better prepared to design alternative 
systems to meet different policy objectives or to adapt to 
changing circumstances in the field of public employee 
collective bargaining in Montana.
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